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INTRODUCTION
The Chief Federal District Judge in the Northern District of Texas
signs a “Special Order” on March 13, 2020, effectively halting the judicial
process in its tracks. “[A]ll grand jury proceedings between now and through
May 1, 2020, are continued. All deadlines are suspended and tolled for all
purposes, including the statute of limitations, from today through May 1,
2020.”1 Shortly thereafter, the remaining federal district court judges for the
three other federal districts in Texas hand down similar orders, all using
similar language and each one citing data and reports from the Center for
Disease Control (“CDC”).2 The CDC guidelines highlight the rapid spread of
a novel viral influenza, known simply as the coronavirus.
Thousands of miles away, the Chief Judge in the Northern District of
Vermont is taking equally widespread precautions, and a “General Order” is
signed into law on March 16, 2020. The order states in paragraph 1, “[a]ll
civil and criminal matters scheduled for in-court appearance before any
district or magistrate judge or bankruptcy judge in the District of Vermont
are postponed pending further order of the court. This includes all jury
trials.”3 Meanwhile, Donald J. Trump, the President of the United States,
declares a state of emergency as information regarding the coronavirus begins
to spread faster than the virus itself, which with over 1,600 confirmed cases
in the U.S. since the first confirmed case just three months prior, is spreading
rather rapidly.4
Down in Florida, the state’s Supreme Court is trying to address the
spread of coronavirus through its judicial system. Facing the difficult
challenge of balancing the protection of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
versus the interest of justice, the Florida Supreme Court decides the latter is
of more importance during this time, declaring “[a]ll time periods involving
the speedy trial procedure, in criminal and juvenile court proceedings, are
suspended from the close of business on Friday, March 13, 2020, until the
close of business on Monday, March 30, 2020, or as provided by subsequent

See Special Order No. 13-5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2020).
See Special Order H-2020-6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2020) (same); General Order, No.
20-03 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2020); Additional Order Regarding Grand Jury Proceedings
Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the Covid-10 Pandemic (W.D. Tex. Mar. 16,
2020) [hereinafter “Texas District Court Orders”].
3 See General Order No. 85 (D. Vt. Mar. 16, 2020).
4 Proclamation, White House, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency
Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak (Mar. 13, 2020),
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaringnational-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
1
2
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order.”5 Indeed, subsequent orders would follow. 6
In Texas federal courts, Florida state courts, and just about every other
court in the United States, subsequent orders would continue to be drafted
and signed into law as the coronavirus spread throughout the nation. In each
one, judges would address the uphill battle facing the judicial system as
dockets continued to pile up, motion hearings continued to be postponed,
statutes of limitations continued to be tolled, and defendants continued to
await their day in court. With each passing day, and with each subsequent
order, watchful and observant litigators began to recognize worthy arguments
that will surely find their way into courtrooms once they reinitiate their
regular proceedings.
Under what authority can courts toll statutes of limitations over a
defendant’s objection? How will a defendant’s right to a speedy trial be
affected by the nation’s sudden halt in judicial proceedings? With regards to
jury trials, how will courts guarantee a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial
panel without potentially exposing jurors, court employees, and others to the
spread of the coronavirus? This comment seeks to answer some of those
questions through an in-depth analysis of the legal system’s response to
previous mass pandemics. Arguments are also drawn in from similarities
between what is currently affecting the United States and previous instances
when the nation was at war with foreign enemies or dealt with other natural
disasters. As will become clear, the effects of the novel coronavirus have had
a profound impact on the American judicial system. The nation may very
well indeed be at war with an invisible enemy, combatting another natural
disaster.
How courts respond to this pandemic will shape the future of the
judicial system in the United States. Beyond subsequent orders, both general
and special, federal and state courtrooms will determine how litigation is
handled for the near future. Fortunately there is some precedent for these
seemingly unprecedented times, and although history may not provide all the
answers, a close inspection of some of this country’s past judicial stoppages
is an informative starting point.

5 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-13, Emergency
Procedures in Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar. 13, 2020).
6 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-23,
Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar.
18, 2020); See also Amendment 1 (Fla. May 4, 2020); Amendment 2 (Fla. May 21, 2020);
Amendment 3 (Fla. June 8, 2020).
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I. BACKGROUND OF COURT CLOSURES
Even the Supreme Court of the United States looked to the past when
announcing its postponement of oral arguments due to the COVID-19
outbreak. On the Court’s official website, a press release was published on
March 16, 2020. The statement read “[t]he Court’s postponement of
argument sessions in light of public health concerns is not unprecedented.
The Court postponed scheduled arguments for October 1918 in response to
the Spanish flu epidemic. The Court also shortened its argument calendars
in August 1793 and August 1798 in response to yellow fever outbreaks.” 7
However, though it may be reassuring to know this isn’t the Supreme Court’s
first closure in response to a global pandemic, the Court’s press release does
not instruct lower courts on how they should proceed. Rather, individual
courts have been left to make their own decisions regarding closures,
postponements, and tolling decisions. These decisions have attempted to
balance the interests of parties who have waited days, months, sometimes
years for their hearings, some of which are legally mandated, against the
health of judges, clerks, courtroom deputies, staff, lawyers, jurors, and
defendants all present within the courtroom. Many courts do not have the
luxury of looking back to 1793 and their system’s reaction to yellow fever.
Instead, some are learning on the fly how difficult it can be to handle such a
roadblock in their docket.
But mass pandemics are not the only source of guidance on this issue.
Court closures are not new. In fact, many states have already enacted
legislation specifically to address and mitigate a disaster's effects on the
ability of litigants to file documents and proceed with their cases despite an
inaccessible courtroom. For example, a California statute entitled
“Government Code Section 68115” vests the Judicial Council's chair with
wide-ranging powers to handle such mitigation. 8 These powers might arise
during war, insurrection, pestilence, public calamity, the destruction of a
courthouse, or when mass arrests threaten orderly court operations.9
This section covers some of those instances that led to court closures,
including a look at the pandemic most frequently compared to the ongoing
coronavirus outbreak, the Spanish flu outbreak in the early 20th century.
A. Previous Pandemics
The CDC estimates that the Spanish flu epidemic took 675,000 lives
7 Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 16, 2020), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_03-16-20.
8 Cal. Gov't Code §68115(a), (b).
9 Id.
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throughout the United States and 50 million worldwide.10 Approximately
one-third of the entire global population was suspected of becoming infected
with the virus, a strain of H1N1 with avian origin.11 In Washington D.C.,
where the Supreme Court had just issued their postponement of arguments at
the start of its 1918-1919 term by about a month, more than 33,000
Washington residents would fall ill between October 1, 1918 and February 1,
1919. Of that number, roughly 2,895 would wind up dying from the disease
according to the Influenza Encyclopedia of the University of Michigan
Center for the History of Medicine. 12
As previously mentioned, the Court had dealt with mass pandemics
just two decades before, when they declared similar postponements. 13 Those
decisions came back when the Supreme Court was responding to outbreaks
of yellow fever, another severe virus believed to be transmitted mainly
through mosquitos. In those prior instances, the Court was laying the
foundation for what circumstances warranted stoppages of high-profile court
proceedings. The Court was tasked with balancing the dangers of an outbreak
in Philadelphia, then the nation’s capital, versus the interests of justice.
“There being some appearances of the Yellow Fever in Waterstreet, between
the Bridge and Walnut Street, the lawyers agreed to continue most of the
Causes, and our Court broke up yesterday,” Justice James Iredell wrote on
Aug. 8, 1798.14 “We have been adjourned on account of the epidemic as it
was not thought right to require lawyers to come, often across the continent,
to a crowded and infected spot,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote.15
Despite over 200 years in separation, the same concerns raised by
Justice Holmes are the ones confronting litigators and law firms today. When
asked to comment on the Supreme Court’s recent postponement of oral
arguments, Michael W. McConnell, a Stanford University law professor and
senior of counsel to Wilson Sonsini, who was to argue on March 25th in
Carney v. Adams representing Delaware in defending its judicial selection
system, had this to say - “I am in California, where my county has issued a
10 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Immunization
and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), 1918 Pandemic (H1N1 virus) (Mar. 20, 2019),
available at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-pandemic-h1n1.html.
11 Id.
12 District of Columbia Health Officer, Annual Report of the Commissioners of
Columbia Year Ended June 30, 1919, Vol. III, Report of the Health Officer, 18 (1919),
available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.1430flu.0014.341. (The mortality figure also
includes 680 deaths due to pneumonia brought on by influenza).
13 Mark Walsh, Outbreaks of Disease Have Shuttered the Supreme Court Going Back
More Than 2 Centuries, ABA Journal (Mar. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/outbreaks-have-shuttered-the-supreme-courtgoing-back-more-than-two-centuries.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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‘shelter-in-place’ order, . . . I can’t say I was looking forward to a transcontinental plane ride in the midst of this virus.” 16
And in addition to the litigators traveling to the highest court in the
land, the very justices who issue decisions themselves cannot be discounted
either. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg turned 87 in March, while Justice
Stephen G. Breyer is 81. Three other members of the court are also at an age
considered to be at the highest risk of death from coronavirus: 65 or older.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel
A. Alito Jr. all fall within this at-risk age group. With so much at stake for
these justices, it’s no surprise that they would seek to take every precaution
necessary to ensure the safety of everyone involved in oral arguments before
the Supreme Court. Rather, what is more surprising is the extent of the
extreme circumstances in which the Court has decided to postpone
arguments. In general, very few instances have risen to this level of severity,
and seldom have they led to total court closures.
B. Other Court-Closing Occurrences
In 2005, a tropical storm formed over the southeastern part of the
Bahamas. It gained intensity as it hovered over warm Atlantic waters, but
actually weakened as it passed over the state of Florida as a Category 1 storm.
Once reaching the Gulf of Mexico, however, Hurricane Katrina would
quickly become the most powerful and devastating storm ever to hit the state
of Louisiana. Twenty courthouses in southeastern Louisiana alone were
damaged or rendered inoperable. Of those damaged buildings was that of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which closed due to the mandatory evacuation of
the city and the loss of basic services such as water and electricity. 17
Following the destruction, legal and administrative issues stemming from the
lack of access to the courts and the mass displacement of the legal community
stifled the progress of any judicial proceedings. In response to these issues,
New Orleans native and Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Pascal
F. Calogero, Jr., in conjunction with the six other associate justices, instituted
a number of efforts to assist in the recovery of the legal system. 18
Among those efforts was ensuring the safety and welfare of judicial
employees, as well as the planning for temporary court accommodations so
that proceedings could begin as quickly as possible.19 Indeed, less than a
Id.
Greg G. Guidry, The Louisiana Judiciary: In the Wake of Destruction, 70 La. L.
Rev. 1145, 1153 (2010), https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol70/iss4/5.
18 Id. at 1155.
19 Judicial Administrator’s Office, The Supreme Court of Louisiana, Justice at Work:
The State of Judicial Performance in Louisiana 2005-2006, 9 (2006), available at
16
17
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week after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the court had set up interim
offices at the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal courthouse. 20 Flexible
leave policies were established to meet the needs of those unable to return to
work, either because of destruction to their homes or the inability to navigate
through flooded streets.21
Other states quickly took notice of the steps Louisiana was taking to
mitigate the harm caused by this natural disaster. Soon, other jurisdictions
were issuing their own disaster relief plans, making it known that they would
be prepared for any potential court closures. Meanwhile, litigators inspected
those newly developed disaster plans, in addition to those already in place,
looking for guidance should another natural disaster affect them.
In California, for example, courts and lawyers needed to be prepared
for any number of natural disasters that could affect deadlines – earthquakes,
wildfires, and landslides to name a few – as well as the possibility of manmade disruptions – power failures, terrorist attacks, and riots. California’s
Government Code Section 68115 vests the power to gauge the impact of any
of these occurrences in the state’s Judicial Council.22 Section B of that statute
states “[u]pon a finding by the court that extreme or undue hardship would
result unless the case is transferred for trial, a pending civil case may be
transferred to any superior court in an adjacent county or to any superior court
within 100 miles of the border of the county in which the court impacted by
the emergency is situated.”
The obvious difference between these solutions and any available to
the current judicial system’s attempt to address the ongoing coronavirus
pandemic is the overarching purpose for the court closures. In 2005,
Louisiana had a shortage of amenities, as many of the state’s courthouses in
the hardest hit areas had been destroyed by flooding and Katrina’s winds.
There was, however, a majority of undamaged courthouses, as well as the
possibility of establishing temporary offices. In the California statute, it is
assumed that there exist courtrooms outside the area in which “the court
impacted by the emergency is situated.” These are issues rooted in a lack of
courtroom space. These disasters are easily traced. Now, however, there is no
such shortage of courtrooms, and the disaster is much more difficult to track.
Courtrooms across the United States are not damaged. They have not closed
their doors because of flooding, fires, or landslides. Rather, it is the people
who fill the courtrooms who carry the potential for imminent harm.

https://www.lasc.org/press_room/annual_reports/reports/2005_06_jp. [hereinafter “Judicial
Performance 2005-2006”].
20 Id. at 8.
21 Id. at 7.
22 Cal. Gov't Code §68115(a), (b).
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C. The Justice Systems Initial Response to this Pandemic
The response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has been widespread,
but it has not necessarily been uniform. Across the United States, federal
districts and state judiciaries have formulated an extensive range of
temporary solutions to address the inability to convene in a court room.
Obviously, the discrepancies across state lines will soon become the topic of
litigation in the upcoming months, but before delving into the future of
litigation post-COVID-19, it’s important to highlight those discrepancies as
they were enacted during the first few days, weeks, and months of the
coronavirus outbreak. Therefore, what follows is a brief highlighting of
notable orders regarding the pandemic from a range of jurisdictions both
federal and state and covering matters both criminal and civil.
Beginning with the jurisdictions first mentioned in the introduction, the
four federal districts in Texas each signed “general” or “specific” orders
using similar language and purporting to toll the deadlines under the federal
criminal statutes of limitations concerning matters pending before federal
grand juries in view of the COVID-19 pandemic.23 Each of those four orders
came between March 13, 2020 and March 17, 2020.
In the Northern District of Vermont, that federal court used differing
language but ultimately came to the same conclusion as the Texas federal
courts. General Order No. 85 effectively postponed all civil and criminal
matters pending further order from the court. Like the Texas federal court
decisions, the Northern District of Vermont issued this order relatively close
in time to the declaration of a state of emergency, which came on March 13,
2020, and like the Texas federal court decisions, Vermont chose to toll
statutes of limitations for the time-being. A little over a month later, however,
the Northern District of Vermont would highlight how certain matters would
be treated differently under the new rules. Specifically, General Order No.
89, filed on April 28, 2020, would outline how the court would handle
criminal cases differently than civil cases. Paragraph 4 under Section 1 states
“[c]ourt-ordered deadlines in criminal cases will need to be revised in many
cases. Counsel shall communicate and submit revised scheduling orders on a
case-by-case basis as appropriate. Scheduling orders now in place remain in
effect until further order of the court.”24 In contrast, the court was far more
blunt about civil matters, ordering all civil trials to be postponed except as
specifically scheduled by the court. 25
In referring back to the initial order, the Northern District of Vermont also
addressed obvious concerns of criminal defendants wondering how their right
Texas District Court Orders, supra notes 1 and 2.
See General Order No. 89 (D. Vt. Apr. 28, 2020).
25 Id.
23
24
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to a speedy trial would be affected by the court’s order. The court stated in
Paragraph 9 under Section 1, “[a]s previously ordered in ¶ 4 of General Order
No. 85, the time period of the postponements implemented by this Order will
be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, as the court specifically finds that
the ends of justice served by ordering the postponements outweighs the best
interests of the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).”26 Although this issue is discussed in further
detail in the “Right to a Speedy Trial” section later on, it’s important to begin
to think about the court’s reasoning and justification here. The same logic
would be implemented by district courts across the nation, subjecting
criminal defendants to extended periods of incarceration that might otherwise
violate their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
For example, in the Northern District of Florida, the same “ends of
justice” language was used by Chief District Judge Mark E. Walker in
Administrative Order No. 349. In addition to all grand jury proceedings from
April 1, 2020 to April 30, 2020 being cancelled, the Order held “[f]or the
reasons stated above and those set forth in Administrative Order 345, which
are incorporated herein, the Court finds that the ends-of-justice are served by
suspending the 30-day statutory speedy trial time period set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(b), resetting the 30-day period to begin anew on the date this Court
permits grand juries in the Northern District of Florida to resume meeting,
and excluding the period of time between the date on which a Defendant is
arrested and the date on which this Court first permits grand juries in the
Northern District of Florida to resume meeting, for all Speedy Trial Act
purposes.”27 Under what authority can this court simply suspend the 30-day
statutory speedy trial time period set forth by Congress, and how can these
decisions, which seem to have been handed down in federal jurisdictions
across the nation, be contested? As mentioned, these questions are the subject
of discussion later on in this comment.
But aside from a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the general orders
being handed down by federal district courts have brought to light other
obvious hurdles that the judicial system must face during this ongoing
pandemic. Statutes of limitations, clearly, have been the subject of many of
these orders, but so too have been one of the more basic fundamental pillars
of the U.S. judicial system – jury trials.
Switching from the federal system but remaining in the Sunshine State,
an analysis of some of Florida’s Supreme Court orders paint a descriptive
picture. On March 13, 2020, Florida Supreme Court Justice Charles T.
Canady issued an Administrative Order (AOSC20-13) suspending all jury

26
27

Id.
See Administrative Order No. 349 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2020).
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trials in Florida's court system for a two-week period.28 At the time, it seemed
as if a two-week suspension would be all that was necessary to combat the
pandemic. Clearly, that would soon prove to be inaccurate. On March 24,
2020, Florida’s Supreme Court issued an additional Administrative Order
(AOSC20-17), extending the suspension of all jury trials in Florida's court
system through Friday, April 17, 2020.29 On April 6, 2020, a third
Administrative Order (AOSC20-23) extending the suspension of all jury
trials in Florida's court system through Friday, May 29, 2020 was handed
down.30 Then on May 4, 2020, Justice Canady issued Amendment 1 to
Administrative Order (AOSC20-23) expanding the list of court proceedings
to be held remotely during the coronavirus pandemic, and extending the
suspension of all jury trials in Florida's court system once again through
Thursday, July 2, 2020. What litigators and their respective clients were
seeing was the court’s inability to predict exactly when jury trials would be
able to resume in their original form. Instead, many jurisdictions are now
attempting to implement some modified jury processes to ensure some cases
can continue.
In Florida, that means “establish[ing] the framework and identify[ing] the
logistics of trying cases remotely.” 31 Subsequently, the state’s Supreme Court
authorized a pilot program for remote jury trials, specifying that the program
was limited to civil cases and would be authorized in only up to five of the
state’s twenty judicial circuits.
In California state courts, remote video technology is being used at least
to some capacity in both civil and criminal cases, as demonstrated by the
Superior Court of California in the County of Sacramento. On March 30,
2020, that court issued its general Order entitled “Arraignments and
Preliminary Hearings - Remote Video Technology,” providing that “all incustody arraignments and preliminary hearings shall be accomplished
through the use of interactive video technology to minimize the physical
proximity of all participants as specified therein.” 32 Notably, that Order
required the consent of the defendant to conduct the proceeding remotely and

28 See supra note 5, Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-13,
Emergency Procedures in Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar. 13, 2020).
29 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-17, COVID-19
Emergency Measures in the Florida State Courts (Fla. Mar. 24, 2020).
30 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-23,
Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida State Courts (Fla. Apr. 6,
2020).
31 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC20-31, Remote Civil
Jury Trial Pilot Program (Fla. May 21, 2020).
32 See Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Order Arraignments and
Preliminary Hearings - Remote Video Technology (Cal. Mar. 30, 2020).
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in compliance with local emergency rules.33 As for civil cases, the court
continues to use video conferencing for preliminary matters
Meanwhile, in Massachusetts, that state’s Supreme Court is allowing
more flexibility and less judicial interference with regards to civil cases,
where “due to the continuing challenges of conducting in-person depositions
during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Judicial Court, pursuant to its
superintendence and rule-making authority. . .” issued the following order:
“[1] Any deposition taken in a civil case pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 and
30A, and pursuant to Court Department rules and standing orders, may be
conducted remotely (remote deposition), that is, in a manner that allows for
the deponent, all other persons entitled to attend (e.g., the parties, counsel for
the parties, counsel for the deponent), and all other necessary persons (e.g.,
the officer/court reporter) to participate without attending the deposition in
person. [2] Neither a stipulation of the parties nor a court order is required to
conduct a remote deposition.”34
To dig through each state and federal court order and analyze the
ramifications would take far more time than the orders themselves are
effective for. Many of these rulings contain within them clear deadlines for
when they should expire, or otherwise contain language that insists rules will
change “pending further court order.” The above examples simply highlight
some of the statutory and constitutional hurdles confronting the judicial
system moving forward during the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic –
mainly, issues regarding statutes of limitations, jury trials, and criminal
speedy trials. With each judicial order handed down, a plethora of questions
stem from the effects on litigants. In taking each topic and looking towards
the authority these courts have to implement such rules, plaintiffs and
defendants, prosecutors and defense attorneys, will learn what the future of
litigation in the United States will look like in a post-COVID-19 world. Each
topic deserves specific attention. Therefore, this comment begins with
perhaps the most novel – statutes of limitations and their enforcement beyond
a defendant’s objection in light of COVID-19.

II. TOLLING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
In 2010, Justice Stephen Breyer issued the majority opinion for United
States v. Comstock, in which the Supreme Court held, among other things,
that Congress undoubtedly had the power to enact legislation altering the

Id.
See Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Orders, Supreme Judicial Court order
regarding remote depositions (Mass. May 26, 2020).
33
34
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federal criminal statutes of limitations.35 This power came from the U.S.
Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, Breyer reasoned. “[T]he
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal
legislation.”36 Along with that authority came the power to create and define
crimes. It followed, then, that Congress could define limitations periods with
regards to those crimes. Indeed, Breyer noted in the Comstock opinion that
“the Constitution, which nowhere speaks explicitly about the creation of
federal crimes beyond those related to counterfeiting, [t]reason, or Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas or against the Law of Nations,
nonetheless grants Congress broad authority to create such crimes.”37 Shortly
thereafter, lower courts began to solidify that notion. In 2013, the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska held that “[j]ust as Congress
[is] empowered to define the crime, including the statute of limitations,
[Congress is also] empowered to provide for tolling of the statute of
limitations.”38
Clearly, there is precedent for criminal statutes of limitations to be
postponed, extended, and tolled so long as Congress passes some sort of
statute covering the issue. The problem facing U.S. court systems now,
however, lies in the fact that criminal statutes of limitations have not been
extended by any Congressional action at this point in time. Rather, most of
the judicial system has taken it upon themselves to issue their own general
and specific orders. From a separation of powers perspective, this means that
as these limitations periods expire, the Government may lose the ability to
prosecute individuals who’s alleged crime occurred near that limitations
threshold.
For civil cases, additional issues arise. Many court orders either specify
that civil cases will fall in priority to criminal matters, or don’t specify how
those matters will be handled at all. Civil litigants are keeping a watchful eye
of new orders that are handed down, patiently awaiting their opportunity to
file their lawsuit, yet fully aware that time is ticking and a backlogged docket
does not favor their claim.
How will litigators respond to these novel issues? A likely solution will
be the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling. Another, at least for purposes of
criminal litigation, may be the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act. An
explanation of both is necessary in order to understand how each will be
utilized in the courtroom over the upcoming months.

United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010).
Id.
37 Id. at 135 [internal citations and quotations omitted].
38 United States v. Arrington, 2013 WL 5963140, at *7 (D. Neb. Nov. 7, 2013).
35
36
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A. Issue
The purpose of any criminal statute of limitations is to reflect “a
legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is
sufficient to convict.”39 In both criminal and civil contexts, statutes of
limitations are meant to protect parties from having to defend themselves
from the government or opposing parties “when the basic facts may have
become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of
official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.”40
In the days after the declaration of a state of emergency, when courtrooms
were announcing their closures for periods of roughly two weeks, it was not
expected that statutes of limitations would soon become a ground for debate.
However, as time has shown, the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic has
prevented courts from reopening, or at least severely limited their capacity to
move cases along. As days turned into weeks and weeks turned into months,
it became clear that statutes of limitations, both criminal and civil, would
need to be addressed by prosecutors and plaintiffs. When defendants proffer
a statute of limitations defense, it is the burden of the opposing party to
establish compliance, showing either that the cause of action occurred within
the limitations period or that an exception to the limitations period exists. 41
B. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
Generally, federal law provides that non-capital criminal offenses must
be brought against defendants no later than five years after the alleged
crime.42 Certain crimes may warrant extended limitations periods, such as
ten years for bank fraud, as defined in 18 U.S. Code § 3293, or six years for
securities fraud, covered in 18 U.S. Code § 3301. A number of circumstances,
however, may warrant the extension of a limitations period under the general
statute – offenses against children, certain terrorist offenses, fugitives from
the law to name a few. Notably absent from that list, however, are public
health crises.
But one such circumstance is defined in 18 U.S. Code § 3287 and is
commonly referred to by its abbreviated name, the “Suspension Act.” The
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act provides for a suspension of the
statute of limitations for certain specified offenses “[w]hen the United States
is at war or Congress has enacted a specific authorization for the use of the
39 United States v. DeLia, 906 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stogner v.
California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)).
40 Id. (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970)).
41 Musacchio v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 709, 718 (2016).
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
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Armed Forces.” The statute only applies to criminal actions, and therefore it
likely won’t be used by civil litigants in the near-future when attempting to
rebut limitations defenses. That caveat stems from a Supreme Court decision
in which Justice Samuel Alito issued an opinion holding that “[t]he 1921 and
1942 versions of the [Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act] were enacted
to address war-related fraud during, respectively, the First and Second World
Wars. Both extended the statute of limitations for fraud offenses ‘now
indictable under any existing statutes.’ Since only crimes are ‘indictable,’
these provisions quite clearly were limited to criminal charges.”43
Further, the Suspension Act only tolls a set list of federal crimes, not all
federal crimes. Though Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel.
Carter made the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act prospectively
applicable to future wartime frauds rather than merely applicable to past
frauds as earlier versions had held, the list of crimes covered under the
Suspension Act remained finite. The current version of the Suspension Act
reads as follows:
When the United States is at war or Congress has enacted a specific
authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b)
of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)), the running of any
statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or
attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any
manner, whether by conspiracy or not, or (2) committed in connection
with the acquisition, care, handling, custody, control or disposition of any
real or personal property of the United States, or (3) committed in
connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance,
payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or
settlement, of any contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is
connected with or related to the prosecution of the war or directly
connected with or related to the authorized use of the Armed Forces, or
with any disposition of termination inventory by any war contractor or
Government agency, shall be suspended until 5 years after the termination
of hostilities as proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation, with notice to
Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.
18 U.S.C. § 3287. In reading the statute, it’s clear that Congress intended for
the Suspension Act to be triggered under only one of two routes: (1) when
the United States is at war or (2) when Congress has enacted a specific
authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) of
the War Powers Resolution.
43 Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States., ex rel. Carter, 135 S.Ct. 1970
(2015).
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The conditions are black and white, and it seems as if there is no way for
the Government to successfully meet those requirements. Yet, during this
time of unprecedented viral spread, it’s possible that prosecutors will need to
argue that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is the best way of
tolling statutes of limitations when the facts of the case even remotely line up
with the crimes listed in the statute.
The more likely option will be to argue the first triggering mechanism,
that the “United States is at war.” Frankly, it seems unlikely at this point in
time that Congress would enact any specific authorization for the use of
Armed Forces to combat the spread of COVID-19. The most encompassing
piece of legislation addressing the pandemic, the “Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act” or the “CARES Act,” makes no suggestion of
the possibility of an armed combative response. 44 The only other option
warrants at least some discussion.
Though not officially declared one by Congress, the COVID-19
pandemic has certainly made many Americans feel like the United States is
at war. Frontline medical workers have been referred to as warriors as they’ve
battled the pandemic. The President of the United States even tweeted that
the world was “at war with a hidden enemy.” 45 Regardless, the President’s
tweets and the frontline workers’ grit is not sufficient to trigger the
Suspension Act. Rather, at least some federal courts have used a factors-test
to determine whether or not the country was at war.46 In United States v.
Prosperi, the District Court of Massachusetts listed the following four factors
that a court should consider in deciding whether the United States is “at war”
for purposes of the Act: (1) the extent of the authorization given by Congress
to the President to act; (2) whether the conflict is deemed a “war” under
accepted definitions of the term and the rules of international law; (3) the size
and scope of the conflict including the cost of the related procurement effort;
and (4) the diversion of resources that might have been expended on
investigating frauds against the government. Other jurisdictions that have
used this factors-test include the Southern District of Mississippi and the
Western District of Texas.47
Subjecting the spread of COVID-19 to the Prosperi factors leads to an
inconclusive result, which at the very least, poses an interesting problem for
44 See Public Law 116-136, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(the CARES Act) (enacted March 27, 2020) [hereinafter “The CARES Act”] .
45 Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter (Mar. 17, 2020, 3:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1239997820242923521.
46 United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 449 (D. Mass. 2008).
47 United States v. Pearson, 2010 WL 3120038, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 2010).
(holding that U.S. was “at war” for purposes of Suspension Act during military actions in
Iraq and Afghanistan); United States v. Barrera, 2009 WL 10680035, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 9, 2009).
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judges deciding on the issue. First, a court would examine the extent of the
authorization given by Congress to the President to act. At this time, Congress
has not authorized the President to use armed force, but the CARES Act does
provide for some of the effects of the President’s declaration of a state of
emergency. For example, Section 1109 authorizes the Department of the
Treasury to establish criteria for insured depository institutions to participate
in a small business interruption loans program to provide loans under section
7(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a)) until the date on which the
national emergency declared by the President expires.48 Other sections of the
act provide guidance on protected health information during the declared
state of emergency and the authorization for the Secretary of Education to
waive certain statutory or regulatory provisions during the same. 49 Clearly,
the extent of the authorization given by Congress to the President to act is, at
the very least, traceable. Moving to the second factor, “[d]efinitions rather
emphasize the element of armed conflict, whether among States or between
States and insurrectionary forces.” 50 By this standard, the pandemic likely
falls short of meeting the threshold for being “at war.” However, the final two
prongs of the Prosperi test may suffice to surpass that bar. The third factor,
specifically, weighs in favor of the COVID-19 global health crises being
deemed a war for purposes of the act. The size and scope of this conflict is
like nothing the United States has faced in the last century. Surely, the death
count paints a picture reminiscent of times of war in the United States.
Finally, the diversion of resources that might have been expended on
investigating frauds against the government is another factor weighing in
favor of an “at war” determination. The federal government has made great
expenditures in trying to combat the spread of COVID-19, including sending
stimulus checks to Americans, purchasing large quantities of health and
medical equipment, and putting more money into finding a long-term vaccine
to stop any further spread.
Yet, some courts have disagreed with the Prosperi analysis entirely,
pointing specifically to the Supreme Court’s holding that “the [Suspension
Act] should be ‘narrowly construed’ and ‘interpreted in favor of repose.’”51
It makes far more sense that the term “at war” be interpreted as only those
instances when Congress has officially declared so.52 Under this more rigid
standard, the ongoing global health pandemic falls flatly short of triggering
48 The Cares Act §1109(a) United States Treasury Program Management Authority
supra note 44.
49 Id. at §4223; Id. at §4511.
50 Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 451 supra note 46.
51 Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 1978 (2015) supra note 43 (quoting
Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953)).
52 United States v. Western Titanium, Inc., 2010 WL 2650224, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 1,
2010).
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the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act. In jurisdictions that follow this
standard as opposed to the Prosperi test, what other methods might
prosecutors use to effectively toll a statute of limitations over a defendant’s
objection? One potential answer has to do with equitable tolling.
C. The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling
Equitable tolling is a common law principle based on the idea that certain
extraordinary circumstances warrant the pausing or temporary suspension of
the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]enerally, a
litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. 53 Importantly, Justice Alito held
in Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States that these
conditions were “elements”, not merely factors that the court considered. 54
This doctrine may seem like a useful tool for prosecutors seeking to bring
charges against criminal defendants during the ongoing pandemic. One
would hope that most U.S. Attorneys were diligently pursuing their cases,
and it is hard to doubt that the wide array of court closures stand in their way.
However, for most of its history, the doctrine of equitable tolling has mainly
been used in civil litigation. Therefore, an analysis of the civil statutes at play
are most relevant.
For civil cases, time limitations on the commencement of actions arising
under Acts of Congress are established by 28 U.S. Code § 1658, which states
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of
Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be
commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues. 55 As for state
judicial systems, the statutes of limitations on filing civil actions vary by
jurisdiction and by the cause of action. For example, California’s statute of
limitations is generally governed by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 312, which
requires litigants file their lawsuit within four years for written contract
disputes, three years for property damage, and two years for personal injury.
Contrast these statutes of limitations with those in Florida, where Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 95.011 governs and requires litigants to file their lawsuits within five
years of written contract disputes, four years for property damage, and four
years for personal injury.
This isn’t to say that civil litigation will be only recipient of equitable
tolling arguments. However, courts lack uniformity on whether the doctrine
can or should be applied in criminal cases. At least some jurisdictions have
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 750, 756 (2016).
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
53
54
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debated the issue. Although it is most typically applied in civil actions, “there
is no reason to distinguish between the rights protected by criminal and civil
statutes of limitations,” held the United States Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.56 That court would even double down on that holding, later
reaffirming that “we have never foreclosed the possibility that equitable
tolling applies to criminal statutes of limitations.”57 But, prosecutors should
not jump on the bandwagon too eagerly. In United States v. Atiyeh, the Third
Circuit specified that the doctrine should only be invoked “sparingly,” and
that only under very narrow circumstances would it consider the argument. 58
So what is considered the proper “extraordinary” circumstances to invoke
the doctrine of equitable tolling, and does the COVID-19 global pandemic
meet those standards? Referring back to Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held,
and the Supreme Court affirmed, that finding extraordinary circumstances
required “a litigant seeking tolling to show an ‘external obstacl[e]’ to timely
filing, i.e., that ‘the circumstances that caused a litigant's delay must have
been beyond its control.’”59 But that alone isn’t the only consideration. The
Supreme Court has also held that “[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling, as
applied to federal statutes of limitations, extends an otherwise discrete
limitations period set by Congress. Thus, whether tolling is available is
fundamentally a question of statutory intent.”60 Put into clearer terms, the
statutes of limitations drafted by Congress are presumed to be subject to
equitable tolling, unless such equitable tolling would be inconsistent with the
statutory text.61 Taken together, the availability of equitable tolling depends
on the statute of limitation imposed by Congress and the extraordinary
circumstances that prevent a diligent litigant from pursuing the proper course
of action.
But there are even more considerations that will complicate matters
further as litigators attempt to navigate this unchartered territory. As far as
state judicial systems go, whether a federal court sitting in diversity would
consider tolling orders controlling substantive state law in the absence of
binding state case law is up in the air. As has been shown above, many state
courts differ in their handling of court closures – some tolling statutes of
limitations and others leaving them untouched. In this regard, equitable
tolling may be applied and misapplied across various jurisdictions. This of
course assumes that the pandemic even satisfies the “extraordinary
United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1998).
United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 367 (3d Cir. 2005).
58 Id.
59 Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 750, 756 (2016).
60 Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014).
61 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002).
56
57
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circumstances” required to invoke the doctrine.
However the alternative seems equally if not more likely. There has not
been any clear indication that the spread of COVID-19 will be a circumstance
sufficient to allow litigants to win their equitable tolling argument. In the past,
the Supreme Court has held that “[p]rocedural requirements established by
Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by
courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.”62 It’s unclear whether
the Supreme Court would hold the same for state orders preventing access to
federal or state courts, considering the doctrine of equitable tolling is
supposed to applied “sparingly.”63
For some context, it helps to look at some instances when equitable
tolling was deemed acceptable given the “extraordinary circumstances.”
Hanger v. Abbot saw the Supreme Court approve of equitable tolling in the
midst the Civil War “during which the courts in Arkansas were closed on
account of the rebellion.”64 Osbourne v. United States held that equitable
tolling applied when a plaintiff was unable to assert their rights while he was
held as a prisoner in Japan during World War II.65 In a callback to Louisiana
courts dealing with rain damage, Murray v. Cain, though not related to
Hurricane Katrina, allowed equitable tolling to be applied when a Louisiana
State Penitentiary was under a state of emergency due to flooding, causing
the petitioner to be evacuated from the prison and delaying his filing.66
Whether the spread of COVID-19 rises to the level of “extraordinary
circumstances” displayed in the above examples will likely be the result of
skilled litigation. If prosecutors and plaintiffs are faced with a defendant’s
statute of limitation defense, it will be upon them to show the hardships they
faced at no fault of their own during the court closures caused by this global
pandemic.

III. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
In the United States, all criminal defendants are ensured the right to a
speedy trial. This right may arise by statute, through a state’s constitution, or
under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The federal Speedy
Trial Act was enacted to help establish some guidelines to determine when a
violation of that right to a speedy trial occurred. These guidelines often placed
a time limit on when the prosecution had to bring a defendant to trial after
Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984).
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).
64 Hanger v. Abbot, 73 U.S. 532 (1867).
65 Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947).
66 Murray v. Cain, 2019 WL 1417442, at *3-4 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2019).
62
63
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they had been arraigned or indicted. In the individual states, further
guidelines were established. In some, the guidelines were clear, allowing the
prosecution a specified number of days before a violation could be brought
to the court’s attention. In others, the guidelines were less clear, allowing the
court more flexibility in determining violations. Regardless, a state may offer
a defendant greater speedy trial rights than are required by the U.S.
Constitution, but may not reduce those rights. If shown, a violation of the
Speedy Trial Act meant a defendant could have their charges dismissed had
the case not yet reached trial, and if it had, the conviction and sentence wiped
out.
The justification for the Speedy Trial Act is obvious – a defendant should
not be forced to face unreasonable lengths of confinement before he or she
has had the chance to defend their innocence. Often defendants are held in
custody after being denied bail or being unable to pay the amount set. In these
cases, the right to a speedy trial ensures those innocent until proven guilty do
not spend months under incarceration.
An additional justification stems from the quality of evidence over the
passage of time and the defendants right to present that evidence at trial. The
Speedy Trial Act guarantees a defendant the ability to gather and present
evidence while it is still relatively fresh. Witnesses may struggle to recall
important details about a case, harms committed years in the past may lose
their sting, and punishment for those harms may seem unjust if lengthy
amounts of time have already passed.
Despite the justifications for the right to a speedy trial, criminal
defendants still have the ability to waive this right. Should a defendant choose
to bring a claim on the grounds that their speedy trial right was violated,
courts often look to whether that defendant raised the proper objection at an
earlier time. This failure to raise the issue can also be viewed in conjunction
with any benefit that the defendant received as a result of the delay. Viewed
in totality, a court may find sufficient reason to deny a defendant’s claim that
their right to a speedy trial was violated.
Whether the COVID-19 pandemic rises to that level will undoubtedly be
the subject of litigation in the coming months. On the federal level, the
coronavirus outbreak has forced courts to reschedule, or outright cancel,
everything form grand jury hearings to arraignments and indictments.
Motions hearings, trials, and sentencing have all likewise been pushed further
and further back on dockets throughout the federal system. As state judicial
systems continue to hand down similar, yet more jurisdictionally specific
orders, the backlog of criminal cases continues to grow and the clock on each
defendant’s speedy trial countdown continues to tick.
To better understand the problems facing speedy trial rights moving
forward through this pandemic, an analysis of the validity of those federal
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and state court orders is helpful. The following section takes a look at some
of those new rules implemented in the judicial system and determines
whether they will be the subject of future debate in courtrooms once they
reopen.
A. Issue
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have forced state and federal
courts to balance public interest and safety against the rights of criminal
defendants to a speedy trial. The need for social-distancing in response to the
pandemic has made it difficult, if not impossible, for courtrooms to operate
on schedule. That, in turn, has made compliance with the Speedy Trial Act a
new hurdle for the government in criminal cases.
The blanket orders that federal and state courts have enacted which
effectively toll the right to a speedy trial have been applied generally and not
on a case-by-case basis. Without looking at the factors of each defendant’s
case, numerous objections can be raised questioning the validity of these
orders. The U.S. Constitution, along with previous Supreme Court decisions,
establish a number of factors that must be considered when denying a
defendant’s speedy trial rights. Simply asserting that the court closures serve
the ends of justice, without more, will cause an up-rise in speedy trial
challenges, leading to the dismissal of more charges and wiping out more
convictions and sentences.
B. The Speedy Trial Act
As previously mentioned, the Speedy Trial Act establishes maximum
time periods for the different stages of a federal criminal prosecution.67 The
time period between an arrest and indictment cannot exceed thirty days.68 The
time period between arraignment and trial cannot exceed seventy days.69
Failure to comply with either of those time limits necessarily results in a
dismissal of all charges, either with or without prejudice. 70 There are,
however, a number of permissible extensions for each of those time periods
under certain circumstances. Some of those permissible extensions are
relevant in addressing speedy trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Under Section 3161(b), if a grand jury was not convened in the district
during the original 30-day period, then “the period of time for filing of the
indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.” A number of federal
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).
69 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c).
70 18 U.S.C. § 3162.
67
68
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districts have used this portion of the statute to grant extensions. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Vermont, previously discussed in this
comment, was one such jurisdiction. 71 Another was the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maine, which cited Section 3161(b), just one day after
Vermont did, when announcing that "[d]ue to the unavailability of a grand
jury in this District in May 2020, the 30-day time period for filing an
indictment is tolled as to each defendant until this General Order
terminates."72 The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah’s order used
similar language as well. 73
But a problem arises with the use of Section 3161(b), as many states –
Vermont, Maine, and Utah for example – have realized. That section provides
for only a thirty day extension, and many jurisdictions soon acknowledged
that these court closures were doomed to last longer than the statute provided
relief for. With grand juries being suspended for more than the thirty day
extension, courts needed another justification for their closures. Vermont’s
General Order 89 provided that alternate justification for the tolling of speedy
trials, stating “[a]s previously ordered in ¶ 4 of General Order No. 85, the
time period of the postponements implemented by this Order will be excluded
under the Speedy Trial Act, as the court specifically finds that the ends of
justice served by ordering the postponements outweighs the best interests of
the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7)(A).”74
Section 3161(h)(7)(A) has been the provision of the Speedy Trial Act that
the majority of federal jurisdictions have fallen back on, at least for extending
the time period between arrest and indictment. One explanation for why this
section has proven more useful is simple – in at least some jurisdictions, the
delay has no set deadline. Section 3161(h)(7)(A) covers “[a]ny period of
delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion
or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the
attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the
basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”
Circuits have split on how to determine a limit to the length of any such
extension. For example, the Third Circuit held that "open-ended continuances
to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in
length.”75 At least the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have entirely endorsed the

See General Order No. 89 (D. Vt. Apr. 28 2020) supra note 24.
See General Order 2020-05 (D. Me. Apr. 29 2020).
73 See General Order 20-012 (D. Utah Apr. 28 2020).
74 See supra note 24, 72.
75 United States v. Lattany, 982 F2d 866 (3d Cir. 1993).
71
72
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Third Circuit’s reasoning as well. 76 Contrast this with the Ninth Circuit,
which has a more rigid analysis of the “ends of justice” extension in its
application of the “Definite Duration” approach. 77 This test, adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pollack, requires an "ends of justice"
continuance to be limited in duration, whether through the specification of a
set number of days or a fixed end date. 78
Despite the location, however, federal courts from all across the nation
have used the “ends of justice” provision to continue to push back court
openings and further toll defendants’ right to a speedy trial. Take for example
the Western District of Washington, where pursuant to Section
3161(h)(7)(A), Chief United States District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez found
that “the ends of justice served by ordering the continuance outweigh the best
interests of the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial.”79 The U.S.
District Court for the Central District of Illinois similarly looked towards
Section 3161(h)(7)(A) “given the need to protect the health and safety of
defendants, their counsel, prosecutors, court staff, and the public by reducing
the number of in-person hearings to the fullest extent possible.”80 In the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the court declared pursuant
to Section 3161(h)(7)(A) that "the ever-expanding risk of exposure to
COVID-19 … causes it to be practically impossible to seat a jury and/or
obtain a quorum of grand jurors while maintaining compliance with the
current public health and safety recommendations from the [Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention] and the President."81
Yet, despite this sample of federal courts using the “ends of justice”
justification, few seem to go into further detail about how they’ve weighed
the defendant’s right to their speedy trial, as required by Section
3161(h)(7)(A).82 Rather, the “ends of justice” approach has mainly been used
to effectively declare all defendants equal in their assertion of speedy trial
rights. The problem with that, of course, is that no two cases are the same.
District court orders wiping all defendants’ claims under one general
76 See Greg Ostfeld, Comment, Speedy Justice and Timeless Delays: The Validity of
Open-Ended "Ends of Justice" Continuances Under the Speedy Trial Act, 64 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1037, 1042-52 (Summer 1997).
77 Id. at 1042.
78 United States v. Pollack, 726 F2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1984).
79 United States v. Hughes, 2020 WL 1331027, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2020).
80 See Second Amended General Order No. 20-01, (C.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020).
81 See General Order No. 2020-06, (E.D. Va. March 23, 2020); see also General Order
No. 2020-12, (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2020) ") (citing reasons set forth in Order No. 2020-06 to
exclude time between May 2, 2020 and June 10, 2020 under Speedy Trial Act).
82 For one exception, see the Eastern District of Virginia Order, supra note 81, which
requires the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia to file a motion and proposed
order in each criminal case in which an indictment would be delayed, or purportedly
delayed, due to the absence of a grand jury.
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umbrella means that those cases that could have been pursued but were
unnecessarily delayed along with all other matters would be subject to
challenge.
And still, some courts are finding even other ways to toll speedy trials.
Under Section 3174, federal courts have one more justification for the
temporary suspension or further delaying of a defendant’s demand for a
speedy trial. Primarily, Section 3174(e) states that “[i]f the chief judge of the
district court concludes that the need for suspension of time limits in such
district under this section is of great urgency, he may order the limits
suspended for a period not to exceed thirty days. Within ten days of entry of
such order, the chief judge shall apply to the judicial council of the circuit for
a suspension pursuant to subsection (a).”83 By taking this route, district court
judges face the same thirty-day restriction they face under Section 3161(b),
however 3174(e) allows them to then apply to the judicial council of the
circuit court for approval, where the judicial council may then agree to
declare a judicial emergency based on "calendar congestion resulting from a
lack of resources."84 If "no remedy for such congestion is reasonably
available," it may suspend the seventy-day time limit between arraignment
and trial for the length of the judicial emergency, or up to one year, although
trials must commence within 180 days of the indictment.85
Chief Judge Kimberly J. Mueller from the Eastern District of California
did exactly that on April 8, 2020, when she signed the Eastern District of
California’s Request for Suspension of Speedy Trial Act Deadlines. 86 The
request itself was a seven-page letter describing the District’s struggle in
complying with Speedy Trial Act guidelines. “The COVID-19 pandemic has
exacerbated our pre-existing emergency such that there simply are no other
options for alleviating our calendar congestion, despite the many steps we
have been taking to manage the current crisis since its onset,” the letter says. 87
Both the Southern and Central Districts of California submitted similar
requests to the Ninth Circuit’s judicial council. 88 Subsequently, the Ninth
Circuit approved of all three District Courts’ requests, citing various ways in
which COVID-19 worsened already strenuous conditions in California
federal courts.
What’s interesting about each approval is that the Ninth Circuit does not
See 18 U.S.C. §3174(e).
See 18 U.S.C. §3174(a).
85 See 18 U.S.C. §3174(b).
86 See In re Approval of the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of
California, Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit, (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2020).
87 Id.
88 See Order of the Chief Judge No. 18, (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020); In re Approval of
the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Central District of California, Judicial Council of
the Ninth Circuit (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2020).
83
84
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attempt to define what constitutes an emergency. In fact, the Council
highlights that the Speedy Trial Act itself does not clarify it either: “[t]he
statute does not specify what qualifies as an emergency or what factors to
assess before determining that there is ‘no reasonably available remedy.’ In
the legislative history of the [Speedy Trial Act], many members of Congress
commented on the importance of a court’s resources to be able to comply
with the Act’s time limits, and the ability to suspend time limits if a court
could not meet those requirements.”89
Whether courts should consider Congressional intent when reading into
the Speedy Trial Act’s application to the COVID-19 pandemic will surely be
a litigated issue moving forward. The focus of the statute is based on a lack
of resources available for court procedures to continue. COVID-19 does not
pose any sort of court congestion problem, at least not while courtrooms
remain closed. Rather, courthouses possess all the resources they had in the
past, only now those resources are being directed elsewhere. In the next
section, more on that shift in resources will be discussed in detail. For now,
however, there are other important considerations that need to be addressed
with regard to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
C. Additional Concerns
1. COVID-19 within Jail and Prison Facilities
Perhaps the segment of the U.S. population most at-risk for contracting
COVID-19 is jail and prison inmates and detainees. Correctional and
detention facilities are unique in the challenges they face when trying to
combat infectious diseases. Those who spend time in these facilities, both
inmates and employees, share confined environments for long periods of
time, and buildings are often overcrowded. Combine this with the constant
turnover of employees clocking in and out and the steady flow of new inmates
entering the confines of the facility, and it becomes easy to see how rapidly
a virus such as COVID-19 can spread.
The numbers highlight just how serious the problem can be within
correctional facilities. From April 22, 2020 until April 28, 2020, the CDC
collected aggregate data from thirty-seven state and territorial health
department jurisdictions analyzing the severity of the outbreak. “Thirty-two
(86%) jurisdictions reported at least one laboratory-confirmed case from a
total of 420 correctional and detention facilities. Among these facilities,
COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,893 incarcerated or detained persons and
89 See Judicial Council Approval of Southern District Emergency Declaration; Judicial
Council Approval of Central District Emergency Declaration ; Judicial Council Approval
of Eastern District Emergency Declaration.
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2,778 facility staff members, resulting in 88 deaths in incarcerated or detained
persons and 15 deaths among staff members.”90 These numbers, collected
over the course of only six days, show the staggering amount of risk detainees
face while still awaiting their day in court. Though the CDC recommends
“[p]rompt identification of COVID-19 cases and consistent application of
prevention measures, such as symptom screening and quarantine. . .” to
protect incarcerated and detained persons and staff members, the simple fact
is that it’s nearly impossible to screen each and every individual who enters
a facility for the virus. “[C]rowded dormitories, shared lavatories, limited
medical and isolation resources, daily entry and exit of staff members and
visitors, continual introduction of newly incarcerated or detained persons,
and transport of incarcerated or detained persons in multiperson vehicles for
court-related, medical, or security reasons” all contribute to the rapid spread
of COVID-19 within jails and prisons.91
But besides following CDC guidelines to the best of their ability, how
else are federal and state courts and correctional facilities monitoring and
handling the safety of their prison populations? In New York, some federal
judges are ordering the Wardens of local correctional facilities to provide, in
writing, “a status report concerning the incidence of infection of COVID-19
at each facility and the measures undertaken to mitigate the spread of
COVID-19 within each facility. . .”92 This order was handed down in
response to three defendants filing and continuing to file applications for
release on the basis that their continued confinement, combined with
additional information particular to each defendant’s case, subjected them to
the risk of contracting the virus.
In United States v. Martin, more federal courts are seen taking similar
steps.93 In Maryland, the Martin court found it was necessary to lay some
context before addressing the legal matters at issue, stating “[b]efore
addressing the arguments of the parties and the evidence . . ., it is important
to recognize the unprecedented magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic.”94 At
issue was whether a drug conspiracy defendant, who suffered from asthma,
high blood pressure, and diabetes, and was thus particularly at risk if he
contracted coronavirus, should have had the decision to detain him without
bail reversed. The Government argued that state correction officials at
Chesapeake Detention Facility had established comprehensive health
90 Megan Wallace et al., COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities — United
States, February–April 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) (May 15,
2020) available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6919e1.
91 Id.
92 See Administrative Order No. 2020-14 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020).
93 United States v. Martin, 2020 WL 1274857 (March 17, 2020).
94 Id. at *2.
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measures to avoid a COVID-19 outbreak. Ultimately, the district court agreed
with the Government’s assertions that Martin was a danger to the community,
and that his interests in avoiding the risk of contracting coronavirus were
insufficient to overcome the presumption of detention.95
Despite the decision to keep Martin in detention, however, the Maryland
court made great efforts to highlight the unprecedented nature of the COVID19 pandemic. The court stated “[w]hile correctional officials at [Chesapeake
Detention Facility] and other facilities in Maryland may successfully have
dealt with past viruses and outbreaks of communicable diseases, they pale in
scope with the magnitude and speed of transmission of COVID-19.”96
Additionally, the court made clear that Due Process, along with the Fourth
and Fifteenth Amendments, may be implicated if defendants awaiting trial
could demonstrate that they were being subjected to conditions of
confinement that could subject them to exposure to serious illness. This
would apply to both state and federal detainees, but might realistically only
benefit those defendants that were elderly or suffered from more serious
illnesses and conditions. 97
What has been made clear throughout the pandemic is that temporary
release for defendants will not be given “based solely on generalized COVID19 fears and speculation. 98 Instead, some federal courts are looking to a
factors test, established in United States v. Clark to determine whether
defendants should be entitled to temporary release. “In making this
determination, factors the district court may consider include “(1) the original
grounds for the defendant’s pretrial detention, (2) the specificity of the
defendant’s stated COVID-19 concerns, (3) the extent to which the proposed
release plan is tailored to mitigate or exacerbate other COVID-19 risks to the
defendant, and (4) the likelihood that the defendant’s proposed release would
increase COVID-19 risks to others.”99 Courts are not required to weigh each
factor equally, however, so whether relief is granted is essentially left entirely
up to the discretion of the district court.
At this time, there are no definitive indications of how federal courts are
determining which criminal detainees deserve temporary release. The issue
Id. at *4.
Id. at *2.
97 Id.; See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (“In evaluating the
constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the
protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the
proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. For under
the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law”).
98 United States v. Clark, 2020 WL 1446895 (D. Kan. 2020).
99 United States v. Davis, 2020 WL 1951652 (N.D. Ind. 2020) (quoting United States
v. Clark, 2020 WL 1446895, at *3 (D. Kan. 2020)).
95
96
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varies in complexity when looking at state judicial and correctional systems.
For example, the Judicial Council of California voted 17-2 to “rescind,
effective June 20, the COVID-19 temporary bail schedule that set
presumptive bail at $0 for people accused of lower-level crimes,” a measure
the state had initially taken to curb the spread of COVID-19 in jails and
surrounding communities.100 In contrast, New York’s Governor Andrew
Cuomo ordered the release of certain “eligible” inmates from state and local
facilities.101 In this more virus-combative method, over one-thousand parole
violators were subsequently released after they were deemed incarcerated for
“non-serious offenses.”102 Across the fifty states and other U.S. territories,
different strategies are being used to effectively prevent the spread of
COVID-19 in jails and prisons.
But generally speaking, the tests which have been developed in the past
few months point towards the use of the Due Process Clause and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments for federal and state detainees, respectively.
Certainly, arguments made on behalf of the elderly and medically vulnerable
will prove to be more effective than those made for younger and healthier
defendants. The systems currently in play may favor those who need it most,
but it’s impossible to ignore the inequities of their application. During this
pandemic, however, inequities seem unavoidable. As Judge Kimberly J.
Mueller wrote, “[a]s we are adjusting to work in new and imperfect physical
circumstances, we are beginning to see a rising stream of new motions and
petitions seeking immediate release from confinement in light of COVID-19,
for which no established law guides the resolution and there often are no easy
answers, particularly given the equitable considerations implicated.” 103
2. The Effects of Backlogging on Criminal versus Civil Litigation
Because the right to a speedy trial is reserved strictly for criminal matters
pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the COVID-19 pandemic has already and will continue to force
civil matters further back in court dockets across the nation. The American
100 News Release, Judicial Council, Chief Justice End Some Emergency Measures as
California and Courts Expand Reopening (June 10, 2020), available at
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/judicial-council-chief-justice-end-some-emergencymeasures-as-california-and-courts-expand-reopening .
101 Bernadette Hogan, Cuomo Orders 1,100 Parole Violators Released from Jails Over
Coronavirus Concerns, New York Post (March 27, 2020), available at
https://nypost.com/2020/03/27/cuomo-orders-1100-parole-violators-released-from-jailsover-coronavirus-concerns/.
102 Id.
103 See In re Approval of the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of
California, Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit, supra note 86.
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Bar Association has already begun to inform litigators of this imminent
backlog, stating “[m]easures taken to address the dangers of the coronavirus
are expected to exacerbate the significant backlog of cases in state and federal
courts, not to mention immigration courts that have a backlog of more than 1
million cases.”104
Once restrictions are lifted, court dockets will be forced to handle
criminal matters that are nearing deadlines – either through statutes of
limitations or demands for speedy trials. Defendants that are currently
incarcerated will likely take priority, as jails and prisons will need to free up
space and limit the number of potential COVID-19 carriers and spreaders.
White-collar matters are likely to be considered last on the list of priorities,
and so it can be expected that litigators will push for plea bargains to assist
in lightening the backlog of cases. As one California District Court noted,
“[b]y now it almost goes without saying that we should not be adding to the
prison population during the COVID-19 pandemic if it can be avoided.”105 In
this regard, white-collar criminal defendants may take comfort in knowing
that home confinement appears to be the more appropriate solution, while
white-collar civil defendants may understand that it could be years before
they’re ever forced to show up in court.
Regardless, courts will need to implement new methods of hearing cases
moving forward to combat the extreme backlog of both criminal and civil
cases that were halted by sudden closures and a nationwide shutdown. The
American judicial system will be forced to welcome in a new age of digital
and remote courtroom proceedings, which will undoubtably come with
technical glitches and errors, as well as a plethora of new issues to be
litigated. More on these issues is discussed below.

IV. RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental pillar of the American judicial
system. The Sixth Amendment outlines the rights to a speedy, impartial, jury
trial in criminal cases and the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury
trials in civil cases. In the individual states, most jurisdictions have codified
the right to a jury either in their individual constitutions or in statutes passed
by their legislatures. For example, in Colorado, the state’s constitution
provides “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases”

104 Pandemic Disrupts Justice System, Courts, American Bar Association (Mar. 16,
2020), available at https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2020/03/coronavirus-affecting-justice-system/.
105 United States v. Garlock, 2020 WL 1439980, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020).
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under Article II, Section 23.106 In civil actions, the right to a jury trial is
derived from the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure’s Rule 38 “in actions
wherein a trial by jury is provided by constitution or by statute.”107 Similarly,
Indiana’s constitution provides for the right to a jury in civil actions in its
constitution, stating in Article I, Section 20 “[i]n all civil cases, the right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”108
States throughout the nation codify and recognize the significance of jury
trials. They remain a powerful tool for criminal defendants, civil litigators,
and every entity in between, allowing issues of fact to be decided not by the
judges who hear arguments every day, but rather by their peers who, at least
in theory, can more closely relate to the matters at hand. Historically, only
one issue has been determinative for whether a jury trial is available to civil
litigants – distinctions between cases at common law or suits in equity.
However, the ongoing global pandemic has forced courts to suspend jury
trials, both in federal and state courtrooms, for reasons other than that
historical distinction. Today, one of the most recognized tools of American
jurisprudence has become a main reason why regular court proceedings
haven’t been able to resume. This is because putting together a jury requires
bringing together strangers and confining them in close quarters to hear
arguments over the course of hours, sometimes days. The early stages of jury
selection requires bringing together hundreds of people who are simply
answering their call to civic duty, yet the process in which they’re organized
violates dozens of CDC guidelines.
As an initial response, state and federal courts are currently finding new
ways to call juries to hear cases. The new methods, however, are imperfect
to say the least, and pose major constitutional problems if more intricately
scrutinized. Taking a look at some of the issues confronting American courts
in the upcoming months paints a picture of unprecedented times for litigants,
both civil and criminal.
A. Issue
The most obvious issue confronting the judicial system during the
COVID-19 pandemic is the simple task of bringing together a jury. State and
federal courts will need to address jurors’ concerns about protecting their
health from the earliest stages of the process. While hearing a case, jurors
should be focused only on hearing and weighing facts and evidence, not
worrying about their risk for contracting the virus. To ensure the safety of
jurors, courts will need to develop sanitation and social-distancing procedures
Co. Const. Art. 2, § 23.
Kaitz v. District Court, 650 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1982).
108 In. Const. Art. 1, § 20.
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107
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that minimize the potential for viral spread. In the meantime, however, many
courts have begun using alternative methods for hearing cases, mainly
through the use of virtual communication platforms that will be discussed in
more detail below.
Those non-face-to-face methods will pose other hurdles to litigants,
mainly in the realm of Confrontation Clause issues. It is well established law
that a criminal defendant has the right to confront witnesses testifying against
them in court, but whether Zoom virtual conference calls satisfy that
requirement will surely be a hotly debated topic in the coming months.
Finally, when juries will be able to return to the courtroom is another
question with unclear answers. Obviously, a wide variety of operational
differences and varying levels of the coronavirus’s impact in different regions
of the country will affect re-openings. Courts will need to balance the need
to resume jury trials in their communities with their responsibility to ensure
the safety of court personnel – jurors, court employees, and litigants alike.
Unlike previous issues posed in this paper, there is an extremely limited
amount of precedent for a total shutdown of jury trials. The methods being
used to continue court proceedings virtually, though technologically superior
to anything used in the past, create completely novel problems for the judicial
system. The future is highly speculative, and any solutions will surely be
criticized, modified, and litigated as COVID-19 continues to affect the
nation.
B. When and How Courtrooms Return
The COVID-19 Judicial Task Force recently published a report on the
reimplementation of jury trials in federal courts across the country. 109 In it,
the task force, which is made up of federal trial judges, court executives, and
representatives from the federal defender community and the Department of
Justice, offers suggestions for courts to consider when restarting jury trials.
Notably, the task force makes clear that when jury trials should continue will
be entirely up to individual states, districts, and perhaps even divisions, based
on the differing locations, stage of recovery, funding, and respective opinions
on the appropriate steps necessary to ensure safety. 110
As for the how, the task force goes through the jury selection process and
explains what steps should be taken throughout each phase of the timeline.
First, individual courts should determine the level of personal protective
109 See “Conducting Jury Trials and Convening Grand Juries During the Pandemic,”
COVID-19 Judicial Task Force (June 4, 2020), available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/combined_jury_trial_post_covid_doc_6.10.20.
pdf [hereinafter “COVID-19 Judicial Task Force Report”].
110 Id. at 2.
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equipment (PPE) required by those entering the courthouse. Whether PPE
will be provided to jurors, or if they need to bring their own, will be up to the
individual jurisdictions. If jurors are required to bring their own PPE,
however, courts should recognize the risk involved, including: “1)
contaminated/un-sanitized PPE brought into the courthouse and courtroom;
2) jurors failing or refusing to bring their own PPE; and 3) political statements
or otherwise controversial or inciteful personalized masks.”111
Next, the task force explains ways of communicating to jurors the steps
the court is taking to ensure their safety. Surely, COVID-19 may empower
some potential jurors to use the pandemic as an excuse to avoid jury duty
altogether. Each of the 94 federal district courts maintains its own jury
procedures and policies regarding excuses from jury service, and The Jury
Act also allows courts to excuse a juror from service at the time he or she is
summoned on the grounds of "undue hardship or extreme inconvenience."112
The task force’s report attempts to offer courts suggestions on preventing the
misuse of the juror hardship excuse. Even so, the report acknowledges that
courts should “[p]lan for a lower yield from the jury pool during the
pandemic. Even healthy jurors not considered particularly vulnerable to
COVID-19 may hesitate to serve for a variety of reasons.113
Finally, the report highlights important social distancing and sanitation
practices for the actual jury selection and voir dire process. Main points
include placing signage at courthouse entrances explaining the court’s
response and reminding individuals to maintain proper social distancing,
placing tape marks on floors for proper distancing, having free-standing hand
sanitizer stations, and even bypassing the jury assembly area completely by
bringing jurors directly into the courtroom to view orientation and the Chief
Judge video.114
The report also points towards the possibility of remote jury selection and
the differences between the handling of civil and criminal matters. “Some
courts might consider in civil cases, or in criminal cases with consent, virtual
voir dire with prospective jurors participating from home via
videoconferencing technology.”115
All these suggestions, though helpful in preventing the spread of COVID19, pose a number of hurdles for litigators and court staff. One potential
ramification of the variable timetable is the increase in forum shopping
amongst litigants. It’s likely that civil plaintiff’s set on demanding a trial by
jury will seek out those areas less affected by the COVID-19 pandemic when
Id. at 3.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1866(c)(4).
113 See, COVID-19 Judicial Task Force Report, supra note 109 at 5.
114 Id. at 6-7.
115 Id. at 9.
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possible. On a more basic level, masks may prevent effective voir dire as
attorneys struggle to pick up on changes in emotion from jurors – smirks,
giggles, clenched teeth, all patterns that may show bias or disinterest in the
case. Perhaps the most critical issue has to do with maintaining a fair crosssection of the community. Certain groups such as African-Americans,
Latinos, and the elderly, have been disproportionately affected by the
coronavirus. It’s possible that we see challenges based on these issues in the
months to come.
To dodge these issues, many courts have turned to experimenting with
remote jury trials. Zoom, the leading teleconferencing service throughout this
pandemic, has begun gaining traction in state and federal court proceedings.
A Collin County court in Texas held the nation’s first Zoom jury trial on May
18, 2020, where despite some technical issues, twenty-six potential jurors
called in on devices such as laptops, iPhones, and tablets, to go through the
jury selection process and ultimately hear a one-day civil proceeding with a
non-binding verdict. The experiment has since been the inspiration for dozens
of other similar proceedings.
Florida’s Supreme Court, for example, recently called for a pilot program
“to establish the framework and identify the logistics of trying cases
remotely.”116 The pilot program is limited to civil cases and will be
authorized in only up to five of the state’s 20 judicial circuits, but frankly, the
added expense and effort of connecting with jurors remotely might make
settling more attractive to plaintiffs. In a state where COVID-19 is having
devastating effects, jury trials in civil cases may simply not be worth the risk.
Criminal defendants, on the other hand, will surely continue to invoke
their right to a jury trial. Although virtual court proceedings are beginning to
make their way into criminal courts, mainly though preliminary appearances
and arraignments, the challenges that prosecutors face with regards to jury
trials are not as easily solved with Zoom teleconferences.
C. Confrontation Clause Problems
The Confrontation Clause guarantees a “face-to-face encounter” between
a defendant and his accusers in criminal matters.117 Justice Scalia, in writing
the majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Coy v. Iowa, explained the
rationale for this constitutional requirement: “[t]he perception that
confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because
there is much truth to it. A witness may feel quite differently when he has to
repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting
116 See Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order AOSC20-31, Comprehensive
Covid-19 Emergency Measures For The Florida State Courts (May 21, 2020).
117 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988).
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or mistaking the facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that
man is.”118 Notably, the Supreme Court commented on the literal
interpretation of that “face-to-face” confrontation, describing it as
“irreducible.”119
In the concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor described how some
situations might warrant an exception to that rule, explaining that when it was
deemed necessary, certain case-specific trial procedures could help protect
important public policy interests. The interest Justice O’Connor was referring
to in Coy was the protection of a child witness testifying against their abuser.
However, it’s possible that future litigants will argue the COVID-19
pandemic may trigger the exception as courts seek to protect the important
public interests of safety and prevention of further spread of the virus.
Shortly after Coy, the Supreme Court revisited confrontation clause issues
in Maryland v. Craig. Justice O’Connor’s “necessity” argument was
referenced to permit the use of a one-way, closed-circuit television system,
making it possible for a child witness to testify in a sexual assault case
pursuant to a state statute allowing for such remote testimony. 120 Despite the
Supreme Court appearing to depart from the importance of maintaining faceto-face confrontation, Craig actually doubled down on the significance of
that requirement. The court stated that “[t]he combined effect of these
elements of confrontation – physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact – serves the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an accused
is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of
Anglo-American criminal proceedings.”121
That section, highlighting that the “observation of demeanor by the trier
of fact” serves an important part of confrontation clause analysis, is a key
reason why Zoom trials should not find their way into the criminal court
system. The simple fact is this – it is impossible to ensure that jurors will
remain attentive when sitting on a jury from the comfort of their homes,
workplaces, or anywhere other than the jury box. One could argue that there
is no way of ensuring that attentiveness even from within the courtroom, but
the differences are like night and day. Inside a courtroom, jurors get a sense
of the significance of their role through the many environmental stimuli
present around them. The silence in the courtroom as they enter their jury box
speaks louder than anything they can experience from home. The presence of
the bailiff, court reporter, and judge all paint a picture of the serious nature
of proceedings. The wood benches, the attorneys navigating the well, and the
Id. at 1019 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 1021.
120 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 842 (1990).
121 Id. at 846.
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sound of the gavel as it strikes down all trigger feelings of importance in the
courtroom.
If virtual jury trials were to be allowed in criminal cases, all of those
features of the standard courtroom would be lost. In its place would be the
sound of the neighbor’s lawn mower, the racket of children playing in the
room next door, and the temptation of a cell phone buzzing within a pocket.
Judges can attempt with the best of intentions to limit these outside
distractions, but their attempts simply won’t rise to the level they achieve
when given under the curtain of an official courtroom setting.
More than a decade after Coy and Craig, the Supreme Court revisited the
importance of a defendant’s right to confront a witness in a face-to-face
setting in Crawford v. Washington. The Court rejected any argument that the
State can satisfy the Confrontation Clause by alternative procedures that
produce “reliable” evidence.122 Although Zoom may offer jurors the ability
to keep a watchful eye on defendants, witnesses, and attorneys alike, it simply
doesn’t match the quality of an in-person courtroom proceeding – nor does it
matter. Coy, Craig, and Crawford all establish that a defendant has a
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution’s
witnesses face-to-face in the courtroom with the jury present.

V. CONCLUSION
The problems highlighted in this comment are intended to give litigators
a sense of how the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will affect future courtroom
proceedings. Despite many of the issues having some form of precedent –
either through past court closures, relevant case law, or statutory text – the
severity and intensity of this virus makes predicting the future a difficult task.
As it stands, COVID-19 continues to affect previously enacted court orders,
further exacerbating the problems associated with statutes of limitations,
speedy trials, and jury trials.
How these problems are dealt with is largely in the hands of the attorneys
who face them in the upcoming months. They are the ones who will lay the
groundwork for future generations of litigators who find themselves dealing
with global pandemics, natural disasters, and other catastrophic events.
Viruses like COVID-19 are always evolving, and they will continue to derail
every-day life along with the systems developed during their lulls. However,
the guidance established during this time will prove to be critical when the
next group of litigators seeks answers for their problems.
For now, those who deal with the statutory and constitutional hurdles
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posed by COVID-19 should know that, despite the seemingly unprecedented
nature of the virus, there are arguments to be made that are rooted in history.
Zealous and effective advocates will use the tools they have been given to
challenge the orders tolling limitations periods. Vigilant attorneys will
understand the dangers of standing idly by as their clients await their day in
court, especially if they face incarceration or are already incarcerated. Savvy
litigators will weigh the pros and cons of demanding their client’s right to a
jury trial, a decision with greater implications now than ever before. These
issues are novel, yes, but they are not inexplicable.
It’s a challenging time to be a trial attorney in the United States. In
addition to the difficulties of preparing coherent and effective arguments, trial
attorneys are now tasked with being experts on a vast new range of issues
stemming from this pandemic. Hopefully, this comment provides useful
guidance as courts continue to reopen, and cases continue to be litigated.
***
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